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I. SUMMARY BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED FEDERAL REFORM
A recent report in the Annals of Internal Medicine reveals a wide
array of statistical evidence indicating that an increasingly
significant number of medical residents are experiencing
depressive symptoms, increasing cynicism, and decreasing
1
humanism. A similar report compiling data from a comprehensive
† J.D., University of Iowa College of Law; M.A.P.P., Brigham Young University;
B.A., Brigham Young University. The author wishes to dedicate this article to his
father and mother for their endless pursuit in teaching the eternal time value of
labor. The author also wishes to acknowledge the guidance of Professor Marc
Linder, University of Iowa College of Law, and Mr. Jerome Balter, Public Interest
Law Center of Philadelphia, two of the nation’s humble advocates for labor and
whistleblower reform.
1. See Virginia U. Collier et al., Stress in Medical Residency: Status Quo after a
Decade of Reform, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL M ED . 384, 384 (2002); see also Robert E.
Condon, Fatigue and Resident Performance, 75 AM. C. SURGEONS BULL. NO. 5, 15
(1990) (discussing similar findings in the early 1990s).
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study indicates that “burnout” is common among resident
2
physicians and is associated with sub-optimal patient care practices.
Although these reports provide a cursory assessment of the current
state of affairs governing medical residents, descriptive firsthand
accounts from various medical residents are even more compelling.
An orthopedic surgery resident provides the following account:
I was operating post-call after being up for over 36 hours
and was holding retractors. I literally fell asleep standing
up and nearly face-planted into the wound. My upper
arm hit the side of the gurney, and I caught myself before
I fell to the floor. I nearly put my face in the open wound,
which would have contaminated the entire field
and could
3
have resulted in an infection for the patient.
Another pediatric resident provides a similar account of how
the demanding workload also resulted in near malpractice:
As a resident in the Pediatric ICU, we are expected to be
awake, alert, and cognizant for 36-hour shifts. After a
long night on call, I mistakenly ordered an oral
medication to be given via the IV one afternoon. As a
result, the patient’s breathing slowed down to the point of
requiring oxygen. I was mortified the next day. I can
honestly say I do not even remember writing the order . . .
but I did! I4 was so exhausted that the whole afternoon was
a blur . . . .
Accounts such as these have prompted immediate action
among both law and policy makers. In fact, during the 107th
Session of Congress, the Patient and Physician Safety and
5
Protection Act of 2001 (the “PPSP Act”) was introduced.
Introduced by Rep. John Conyers, the purpose of the legislation is
to amend Title XVIII of the Social Security Act to reduce work
hours and increase the supervision of resident physicians to ensure

2. See Tait D. Shanafelt et al., Burnout and Self-Reported Patient Care in an
Internal Medicine Resident Program, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL M ED . 358, 362 (2002).
3. AM. MED . STUDENT ASS’ N, WORK HOUR STORIES FROM THE FRONTLINES:
HOW PATIENTS AND RESIDENTS ARE AFFECTED, available at http://www.amsa.org/hp/
rwh_cov.cfm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
4. Id.
5. See Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3236,
107th Cong. (2001). As of August 4, 2003, there are both House and Senate
versions of the Act pending before various committees. See Patient and Physician
Safety and Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 1228, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 952, 108th
Cong. (2003).
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6

the safety of patients and resident physicians. Specifically, the
PPSP Act provides the following provisions to ensure its legislative
goals.
First, the Act restricts the maximum hours per week and the
maximum shift length that a resident may work. As the Act sets
forth, residents “may work no more than a total of 80 hours per
7
week and 24 hours per shift.” Additionally, the maximum-hour
8
limit cannot be averaged. Second, it establishes a minimum time
9
off between shifts of ten hours. Third, the Act provides for a
maximum on-call time period by stating that residents “shall not be
scheduled to be on call in the hospital more often than every third
10
night.” Fourth, the Act explicitly provides for a mandatory offduty time to include twenty-four hours off per week and one
11
weekend off per month with no averaging. Fifth, the Act does not
12
provide for any exemptions for particular resident specialties.
Administratively, government entities such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have
received petitions with a similar proposal for resident hour
13
reform. For the most part, the OSHA petition is consistent with
14
the proposed PPSP Act.
The PPSP Act has received unprecedented support from a
number of organizations, such as the American Medical Student
Association (AMSA), Committee of Interns and Residents, Public
Citizen Health Research Group, Center for Patient Advocacy,
Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, and the Union of

6. H.R. 3236.
7. H.R. 3236, § 3(a)(2); see also H.R. 1228, § 3(a)(2), S. 952, § 3(a)(2).
8. See H.R. 3236, § 3(a).
9. H.R. 3236, § 3(a)(2); see also H.R. 1228, § 3(a)(2), S. 952, § 3(a)(2).
10. H.R. 3236, § 3(a)(2); see also H.R. 1228, § 3(a)(2), S. 952, § 3(a)(2).
11. Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3236, 107th
Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2001). Recent versions of the PPSP Act provide that resident
“shall have at least 1 full day out of every 7 days off and 1 full weekend off per
month.” See Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 1228,
108th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2003); S. 952, 108th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2003).
12. H.R. 3236, § 3(a)(4).
13. See Letter from Anandev Gurjala et al., Petition to the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration Requesting That Limits Be Placed on Hours Worked
by Medical Residents (HRG Publication No. 1570) (Apr. 30, 2001), available at
http://www.citizen.org/publications/print_release.cfm?ID=6771 (last visited Aug.
17, 2003).
14. Id. See also PUBLIC CITIZEN, COMPARISON OF PROPOSALS TO LIMIT RESIDENT
WORK HOURS, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/1633attachment.
PDF (last visited Aug. 17, 2003) [hereinafter COMPARISON].
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15

American Physicians and Dentists. Although there were strong
supporters of the PPSP Act as it was proposed to the Congress,
groups such as the American Medical Association (AMA),
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), and the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME),
16
presented hybrid, less-stringent versions of the bill.
For example, both the ACGME and AMA proposals advocate
that the maximum hours per week be more than the eighty-hour
limit set forth in the PPSP Act. The ACGME proposal allows for a
maximum of eighty-eight hours per week, which may be averaged
17
over four weeks.
The AMA proposal recommends that the
maximum-hour limit be set at eighty-four hours averaged over two
18
weeks. Additionally, both the ACGME and AMA proposals set the
maximum shift length at thirty hours rather than twenty-four hours
19
as set by the PPSP Act.
The greatest point of divergence between these alternative
proposals and the PPSP Act regards the question of enforcement.
Both the PPSP Act and an OSHA petition provide for civil penalties
for non-compliance, public disclosure of violating hospitals, and
whistleblower protection. In contrast, the AMA, AAMC, and
ACGME vehemently reject such enforcement measures.
Legal scholars have recently written extensively on the
implications of maximum-hour legislation on medical resident
20
reform. Other scholars have written extensively on the various
15. See Patient and Physician Safety & Protection Act of 2001 Source List, at
http://www.amsa.org/hp/rwhspeak.cfm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
16. See COMPARISON, supra note 14.
17. See id.; see also ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE M ED . EDUC., REPORT
OF THE ACGME WORK GROUP ON RESIDENT DUTY HOUR REQUIREMENTS, available at
http://www.acgme.org/DutyHours/dutyhrs_index.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2003)
[hereinafter ACGME proposal]. On July 1, 2003, the ACGME approved formal
institutional standards for resident duty hours. See Press Release, Accreditation
Council for Graduate Med. Educ., ACGME Duty Hours Standards Now in Effect
for All Residency Programs (July 1, 2003), available at http://www.acgme.org/
Media/news7_1_03.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
18. See COMPARISON, supra note 14; see also AM. MED . ASS’ N HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, REPORT OF REFERENCE COMMITTEE C, at 8-11 [hereinafter AMA
Proposal], available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/upload/mm/annual02/
RefcomC.Annot.doc (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
19. See ACGME Proposal, supra note 17; AMA Proposal, supra note 18.
20. See Dori Page Antonetti, Comment, A Dose of Their Own Medicine: Why the
Federal Government Must Ensure Healthy Working Conditions for Medical Residents and
How Reform Should be Accomplished, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 875 (2002); Lindsay Evans,
Commentary, Regulatory and Legislative Attempts at Limiting Medical Resident Work
Hours, 23 J. LEGAL M ED. 251 (2002); Patrick Knott and Kathleen Ruroede, One
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methods upon which such reforms can be institutionalized.
This paper does not assess the various implications of such
proposals for maximum-hour legislation of medical residents or
22
examine the various costs and benefits of such measures. Rather,
this paper intends to address the various methods by which such
maximum-hour legislation can be enforced. Part II of this paper
examines current state and federal legislative mandates that
23
regulate and enforce medical resident working conditions. Part III
assesses the various non-legislative measures, such as hospital bylaws
and guidelines that attempt to enforce resident training, working
24
hours, and working conditions. Much of the discussion in this
section focuses on the role of the ACGME in enforcing specific
work-hour standards of medical residency programs. Part IV sets
forth the proposition that providing whistleblower protection for
medical residents is an effective means of enforcement—in
particular, that such protection is relatively more effective than
25
either civil fines or discretionary oversight by the ACGME.
Overall, the intent of this paper is to demonstrate that
whistleblower protection can be a superior method of enforcement
to ensure that any proposed maximum-hour legislation is
effectively administered.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES
A. The New York State Model
New York State is the preeminent advocate of legislative
mandates regulating medical resident working conditions. The
death of an eighteen-year-old college student resulting from an
overworked medical resident prompted immediate reform in the
26
early 1990s. In 1998, the New York State Department of Health
Solution for Managing Risks During Cutbacks in Residency Training Programs, 11 RISK
35 (2000).
21. See Evans, supra note 20.
22. See COMPARISON, supra note 14 (for a comprehensive overview of the cost
and benefits of maximum-hour legislation for medical residents).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See Antonetti, supra note 20, at 888; see also Dominic A. Sisti, Zzzzzzzzzz:
Sleep Deprived Residents and Social Control in the Clinic, AM. J. BIOETHICS (Nov. 12,
1998) (discussing that the medical resident administered a drug that
contraindicated with the college student’s scheduled medication, which caused
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issued a report that training physicians in New York hospitals were
working hours that “far exceed the limits” set by the state to protect
27
patients.
Shortly thereafter, the New York State Legislature
amended the state health code, limiting medical residents to an
28
eighty-hour workweek, as averaged over a four-week period.
Additionally, such amendments implement a per se prohibition of
29
on-call shifts of more than twenty-four consecutive hours. Other
provisions included setting maximum-hour limits for residents with
on-duty assignments in emergency rooms to no more than twelve
30
consecutive hours.
New York State also adopted a number of enforcement
mechanisms to ensure compliance. First, the role of monitoring is
delegated to the hospitals. In particular, hospitals are responsible
for monitoring the number of hours accumulated by residents
31
involved in dual employment or “moonlighting.”
Second,
physicians are in charge of supervising residents in their specialty
and such supervision is required on-site, seven days a week, twenty32
four hours a day.
Also, an attending surgeon is required to
personally supervise all surgical procedures, including general
33
anesthesia.
Third, the New York State Health Department
monitors compliance through “routine surveys and complaint and
34
incident investigations.”
The most significant method of
enforcement, however, comes through the department’s wielding
of punitive fines. In the early stages of reform, the department was
the student to suffer fatal respiratory failure), available at http://www.bioethics.
net/er/erbioethics.php?task=view&articleID=438 (last visited Aug. 17, 2003); R.M.
Parker, The Libby Zion Case: One Step Forward or Two Steps Backward? 318 NEW ENG. J.
M ED . 771 (1988).
27. See N.Y. Dep’t of Health, Health Department Releases Residency Review Report
(May 18, 1998) (on file with author); see also Barbara A. DeBuono and Wayne M.
Osten, The Medical Resident Workload: The Case of New York State, 280 JAMA 1882,
1882 (1998) (citing that report is based upon an intensive four-day survey during
which the health department sent unannounced random inspection teams into
New York-based teaching hospitals. The data compiled was based on information
from health department staff interviews of 563 residents and 211 supervising
physicians, verification of 519 medical records, and the calculation of the working
hours for 391 residents based on work schedules, interviews, and direct
observation).
28. See 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS ., tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(a) (2001).
29. See id. § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(b).
30. See DeBuono & Osten, supra note 27, at 1883.
31. Id. at 1882.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1882-83.
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35

authorized by state law to levy fines of up to $2000 per violation.
More recently, under Governor George Pataki’s Health Care
Reform Act of 2000, fines on teaching hospitals for noncompliance
of resident working hours have increased, up to a maximum of
36
$6000 per violation. Hospitals cited for recurring violations may
face a maximum fine of $25,000 for a second offense and $50,000
37
for a third offense.
Unfortunately, such sweeping reforms have been
compromised or ignored, or have received very little enforcement
38
by hospital administrations.
The primary reason that such
reforms have yet to be institutionalized is due to what some have
described as “fruitless self-monitoring” and the “refusal of the
39
medical profession to adapt to changes.” Although New York
State has set up an elaborate citation process, which has resulted in
the administration of significant fines, there are indications that
40
most residency programs continue to disobey the regulations.
Even more recently, strong evidence has suggested that such
mechanisms have not translated into better working conditions for
medical residents. For instance, as recently as June 26, 2002, the
New York State Health Department issued a report citing that since
November of 2001, fifty-four of the eighty-two teaching hospitals
inspected in the state were cited for violations related to resident
41
working hours.
As a result, some argue that the threat of
inspections and the probability that a fine may be assessed are not
sufficient deterrents to residency programs. As one doctor
described, “the regulations attempted to change the culture of
42
medical residencies [but] failed to achieve that goal.”
Despite New York State’s apparent failure, it is only fair to

35. See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Health, NYS Hospital Fined for Violating
Resident Work Hours (June 18, 1998), at http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/
commish/98/workhrs.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
36. See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t. of Health, State Health Department Cites 54
Teaching Hospitals for Resident Working Hour Violations (June 26, 2002), at
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/commish/2002/resident_working_hours.
htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
37. Id.
38. See Esther B. Fein, Flouting Law, Hospitals Overwork Novice Doctors, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, at A1 (discussing how New York hospitals consistently fail to
comply with the new standards and reforms limiting medical resident work hours).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Press Release, supra note 36.
42. See Antonetti, supra note 20, at 889 n.72.
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point out that the state still stands alone as an advocate for
maximum-hour legislation governing medical residency
43
programs. Other states, such as Maine, have gradually extended
maximum-hour legislation to nurses, but have refused to afford
44
similar protection to medical residents. Despite New York’s
leadership role in this area, such regulations have been largely
45
ineffective. Specifically, critics of New York State’s maximumhour legislation have pointed to the various loopholes that allow
46
hospitals to continue scheduling residents without fear of reprisal.
Also, substantial evidence indicates that a significant number of
hospitals continue to operate in noncompliance with the provisions
47
of the legislation.
B. Federal Government Oversight
From a federal perspective, the primary governmental
organization that oversees the rules and regulations affecting
medical residents is the Department of Health and Human Services
48
(HHS). The Agency for Healthcare and Research and Quality
(AHRQ) is an operating division within HHS, with the mission to
“support research designed to improve the outcomes and quality of
health care, reduce its costs, address patient safety and medical
49
errors, and broaden access to effective services.” In 1999, the
AHRQ began an extensive effort to research the problem of
50
medical errors. The net result of their research concluded that
43. It is important to note that an increasing number states, such as Delaware,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, are beginning to follow New York’s lead. See, e.g.,
AM. MED . STUDENT ASS’ N, THE RESIDENT WORK HOUR ISSUE: STATE EFFORTS, at
http://www.amsa.org/hp/rwhefforts.cfm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003). Other states
have developed overtime protection for nurses and other health care
professionals. See SERV. EMPLOYEES INT’ L UNION, STATE LEGISLATION AT A GLANCE
(June 18, 2002). For example, a Minnesota statute specifically protects health care
employees from being discriminated against or penalized for reporting a violation
of federal or state law or a professionally recognized national clinical or ethical
standard. M INN. STAT. § 181.932, subd. 1(d) (2002).
44. See Antonetti, supra note 20, at 890.
45. See Press Release, supra note 36.
46. See Antonetti, supra note 20, at 889.
47. Id.
48. See U.S. DEP’ T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, INTRODUCTION, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/about/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
49. See Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, AHRQ Profile: Quality
Research for Quality Healthcare, AHRQ Publ’n No. 00-P005 (Mar. 2001), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/about/profile.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
50. See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Medical Errors: The Scope
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“long hours, fatigue, and stress” are factors that significantly impair
51
physicians and their ability to perform. The AHRQ’s research
culminated in an announcement by the HHS to allocate nearly $50
million to finance new research projects to “reduce medical errors
52
and advance patient safety.” Unfortunately, despite the extensive
research and resources dedicated to assessing the problems
associated with resident working conditions, the federal
53
government has yet to adopt a standardized policy.
Various reasons are given as to why the federal government is
hesitant to adopt such a standardized policy. First, the underlying
purpose of residency programs is to further the clinical education
54
of novice doctors. The purpose of such programs is significant in
relation to the application of federal labor policy because the
assumption of oversight by the Department of Labor or OSHA
55
requires the existence of an employment relationship. OSHA still
has not decided, for the purposes of regulation, whether medical
56
residents are employees. Thus, until the Department of Labor or
OSHA officially determines that a medical resident is an
“employee,” it is questionable whether protections afforded general
employees would extend to this segment of the medical field.
Second, a significant level of oversight is delegated to the
57
ACGME.
The fundamental purpose of the ACGME is to
collaborate with hospitals in establishing educational standards
58
involving accreditation, duty hours, and resident supervision. A
more thorough examination of the role of the ACGME is provided

of the Problem, AHRQ Publ’n No. 00-P037, available at http://www.ahcpr.gov/qual/
errback.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003); see also Antonetti, supra note 20, at 902-04
(discussing the various role of the AHQR).
51. Antonetti, supra note 20, at 903.
52. See Press Release, Agency for Healthcare and Research Quality, HHS
Announces $50 Million Investment to Improve Patient Safety (Oct. 11, 2001),
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/news/press/pr2001/patsafpr.htm (last visited
Aug. 17, 2003).
53. See Antonetti, supra note 20, at 891-94.
54. See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE M ED . EDUC., MISSION
STATEMENT, available at http://www.acgme.org/About/mission.asp (last visited
Aug. 17, 2003).
55. See Antonetti, supra note 20, at 894; see also Occupational and Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 653(a) (1994).
56. See Antonetti, supra note 20, at 895.
57. See infra Part III.
58. See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE M ED . EDUC., ACGME
HIGHLIGHTS ITS STANDARDS ON RESIDENT DUTY HOURS—M AY 2001, available at
http://www.acgme.org/New/OSHAReponse.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
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in Part III. In short, residency programs may be accredited only if
59
they adhere to the “essentials” of accredited residencies. The
ACGME is a significant entity in that the federal government, in
lieu of adopting national legislation regulating medical resident
programs, has largely delegated such duties to this “quasi60
governmental” body. As a result, the ACGME has historically
established itself as an organization, separate from the federal
government, to which states give wide deference in terms of
61
approving resident training programs.
III. NON-LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS
A thorough assessment of the various ways in which medical
resident working conditions are regulated would be incomplete
without discussing various non-legislative standards, such as
hospital bylaws and guidelines governing resident training, hours,
and working conditions. As mentioned above, the ACGME
requires that “[i]nstitutions must ensure that their GME programs
provide appropriate supervision for all residents, as well as a duty
hour schedule and work environment, that is consistent with
proper patient care, the educational needs of the residents, and the
62
applicable Program Requirements.”
Based on the ACGME’s general standards, teaching
institutions usually draft program-specific policies. For instance,
63
the University of Iowa College of Medicine has adopted the Policy
59. See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE M ED . EDUC., SECTION I
GRADUATE M EDICAL EDUCATION INFORMATION, REVIEW AND ACCREDITATION OF
GRADUATE M EDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, available at http://www.acgme.org/
GmeDir/sect1info.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
60. See Michael J. Frank, Note, Safeguarding the Consciences of Hospitals and
Health Care Personnel: How the Graduate Medical Education Guidelines Demonstrate a
Continued Need for Protective Jurisprudence and Legislation, 41 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. J.
311, 322 (1996).
61. Id. at 321.
62. See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE M ED . EDUC., INSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE M EDICAL EDUCATION,
at II.D., available at http://www.acgme.org/IRC/Ircpr900.aspwww.acgme.org (last
visited Aug. 17, 2003). In fact, the ACGME has attempted to develop a formal
procedure upon which complaints may be brought against a particular residency
program.
See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE M ED . EDUC., ACGME
PROCEDURES ADDRESSING COMPLAINTS AGAINST RESIDENCY PROGRAMS, available at
http://www.acgme.org/ResInfo/complaint.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
63. The University of Iowa College of Medicine is not alone here. In fact,
nearly all hospitals with residency programs are required by the ACGME to adopt
similar policies, schedules, and protocols. See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR
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on the Supervision and Assignment of House Staff, General
64
Statement of Scheduling, and Departmental Statements. The
policy provides a number of guidelines for supervising medical
residents. First, it establishes formal supervision and assignment
65
protocols for departmental programs. Program directors, “in
consultation with the faculty and in accord with the
recommendations of the Association of American Medical Colleges
and requirements of the applicable Residency Review Committee,
will maintain guidelines for ensuring proper supervision and
66
assignment of each house staff member in the program.”
Supervision and assignment protocols generally include policies
that specify the level of supervision and specific faculty who
67
exercise oversight on residents at each level of training.
Additionally, these protocols set forth guidelines assigning
residents based on “specialty, intensity of patient care
responsibilities, level of experience, and educational
68
requirement.” To ensure compliance with the supervision and
assignment protocols, the college defers to the Residency Review
Committee, which conducts regular reviews to determine
69
“compatibility and completeness.”
The General Statement of Scheduling essentially sets forth the
70
call and rotation schedules for the academic year. Additionally,
71
such scheduling sets forth “house call” schedules by specialty and
year of residency. For instance, for first-year and second-year
orthopedic residents, “house call” is usually every fifth or sixth
72
night, but may be every third or fourth night. For third-year
residents, “house call” schedules encompass the trauma rotation
where a resident is on call from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. each
GRADUATE M ED . EDUC., THE ACGME STANDARDS ON RESIDENT DUTY HOURS,
available at http://www.acgme.org/About/roleAcgme.asp (last visited Aug. 17,
2003) (citing that all accredited residency programs must adopt specific standards
and guidelines).
64. Id.; see also UNIV. OF IOWA HEALTH CARE, SUPERVISION AND DUTY HOURS
(approved Jan. 4, 1989), available at http://www.uihealthcare.com/depts/
housestaffaffairs/supervisionandduty.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
65. See UNIV. OF IOWA HEALTH CARE, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. UNIV. OF IOWA HEALTH CARE, supra note 64.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The term “house call” refers to the requirement that residents are to be
on-call and must stay within the hospitals. See id.
72. Id.
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weekday with no more than three nights and one weekend day per
73
week.
Despite the breadth and thoroughness of these standards,
substantial evidence suggests that the ACGME has failed to
effectively enforce such measures. First, the ACGME is in an
extremely difficult position to oversee, discover, and then cite such
74
residency programs that force residents to work excessive hours.
With nearly 7800 accredited medical residency programs, including
75
nearly 110 specialty and sub-specialty programs, the lack of
sufficient oversight resources requires that the ACGME rely on
individual residency program administrators to establish uniform
76
guidelines and standards.
Second, determining violations based on self-reporting
methods such as surveys or questionnaires is problematic because
medical staff and residents are reluctant to report the hospitals
where they work for fear that their programs would lose
77
accreditation.
Additionally, there is a real concern among
residents that the loss of accreditation would significantly hinder
78
the prospects of becoming a licensed physician.
Third, the oversight power of the ACGME is essentially a
collaboration with five other medical organizations: the American
Board of Specialties, the American Medical Association, the
American Hospital Association, the Association of American
79
Medical Colleges, and the Council of Medical Specialty Societies.
In turn, each of these organizations appoints a representative to
80
the ACGME.
Thus, the oversight power of the ACGME is
81
essentially diffused among the participating organizations. In
fact, as one council member expressed, “the ACGME needs to act
in a more independent manner . . . the control of the parents
82
inhibits the ACGME from acting in areas [it] needs to Act [sic].”
Fourth, past experience demonstrates that the ACGME rarely
73. Id.
74. See Sidney M. Wolfe, Public Citizen Petitions OSHA to Limit Residents’ Working
Hours, HEALTH LETTER, June 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 12240092.
75. See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE M ED . EDUC., THE ROLE OF
ACGME, available at http://www.acgme.org/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
76. Id.
77. See Antonetti, supra note 20, at 894.
78. Id.
79. See Frank, supra note 60, at 322.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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finds violations, and if it does, the likelihood that a medical
resident program will lose accreditation is close to nil. In fact, the
ACGME has yet to remove accreditation of any medical residency
83
program for violation of work-hour requirements. Advocates of
medical resident work reform argue that the ACGME guidelines
are perceived by practitioners as “weak, voluntary, and different for
84
each specialty.” Thus, the very culture of the medical profession
promulgates a perception of the standards as superficial,
85
amendable, and rarely enforceable. Some describe ACGME’s
regulations as varying widely by the type of postgraduate programs
addressed, with some program requirements peppered liberally
with the word “must” and others merely indicating targets deemed
86
“desirable.” Advocacy groups have articulated that such a failure
is due to the “shoddy enforcement of the current weak
87
guidelines.”
An example of this can be seen in Massachusetts hospitals
where voluntary codes regulating resident work hours were recently
88
adopted as prescribed by ACGME guidelines.
The code
essentially established that residents should work a maximum of
89
eighty “active patient care” hours per week. Despite the voluntary
code drafted in accordance with ACGME guidelines, both
physicians and residents considered other duties to fall outside the
90
eighty-hour-per-week prohibition. Such duties included drawing
blood, completing reports on laboratory results, and writing notes
91
in patients’ charts.
Thus, despite the guidelines voluntarily
adopted, the eighty-hour prohibition can be easily “translated” into
92
a 110-hour workweek. The above example is indicative of the
ineffectiveness of ACGME guidelines in maintaining and enforcing

83. See Evans, supra note 20, at 257.
84. See Wolfe, supra note 74.
85. Id.
86. See Dominic Papandria, A Review of Issues Surrounding the Regulation of
Postgraduate Physician Work Schedules, AM. MED . NEWS (Sept. 3, 2001).
87. See Letter from Peter Lurie and Sidney M. Wolfe, Letter to the
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education on Medical Resident Duty
Hours (HRG Publication No. 1633) (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.
citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7191 (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
88. See Joshua M. Sharfstein, Asleep on the Job, NEW REPUBLIC, June 21, 1999, at
17.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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favorable working conditions for medical residents.
A. Criterion-Based Exception Approach
Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of ACGME guidelines,
many states have refused to abandon such a non-legislative
approach to enforcing maximum-hour standards for medical
93
residents.
For instance, the University of Minnesota Medical
School’s Graduate Medical Education Administration (UMSS) has
embraced the institutional requirements as set forth by the
94
ACGME. In particular, UMSS adheres to the ACGME’s proposed
95
maximum of eighty-eight hours per week for medical residents.
Minnesota’s approach to enforcing maximum-hour standards
is unique in that individual medical programs have the burden of
demonstrating particular circumstances sufficient to allow residents
to work beyond a set maximum-hour workweek. The Graduate
96
Medical Education Committee (GMEC) is explicitly delegated
authority to “review and endorse” requests from medical programs
in granting an exception to the eighty-eight-hour-per-week
97
standard.
A number of criteria have been developed by UMSS before
GMEC may approve requests for exceptions to the weekly limit on
duty hours. First, requests for an exception must be based on
98
“sound educational rationale.” Again, the burden is placed on
93. See ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR GRADUATE M ED . EDUC., LIST OF ACGME
PROGRAMS
AND
SPONSORING
INSTITUTIONS,
available
at
ACCREDITED
http://www.acgme.org/adspublic/main.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2003) (citing
state-by-state programs accredited by the ACGME).
94. See UNIV. OF M INN. MED . SCH., GRADUATE M EDICAL EDUCATION, MISSION
STATEMENT & GOALS FOR GRADUATE M EDICAL EDUCATION, available at
http://www.med.umn.edu/gme/GME%20Office/mission_statement_goals.html
(last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
95. Id.
96. See UNIV. OF M INN. MED . SCH., GRADUATE M EDICAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE
(GMEC),
INTRODUCTION,
available
at
http://www.med.umn.edu/gme/
gmec/index.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
97. See UNIV. OF M INN. MED . SCH., GRADUATE M ED . EDUC. ADMIN., GRADUATE
M EDICAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE CRITERIA FOR EXCEPTIONS TO DUTY HOUR
REQUIREMENTS (approved Jan. 24, 2003) [hereinafter GMEC Criteria], available at
http://www.med.umn.edu/gme/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2003). See also UNIV. OF
M INN. MED . SCH., GRADUATE M ED . EDUC. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR EXCEPTIONS TO
DUTY HOUR REQUIREMENTS (approved Dec. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.med.umn.edu/gme/ (providing the actual form to be used when
making a request for an exception) (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
98. See GMEC Criteria, supra note 97.
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the medical program seeking an exception to clearly demonstrate
the educational value of increasing the duty hours, the rationale in
doing so, and whether or not the increase in hours will actually
99
contribute to resident learning. Second, programs requesting an
exception must be prepared to demonstrate that there are
sufficient faculty support and resources to monitor the additional
100
duty hours.
Such criteria are met where a requester of an
exception makes a showing that faculty and residents “collectively”
understand their responsibility to patients and where faculty
schedules are arranged so as to provide “continuous supervision
101
and consultation.”
Third, the requester needs to sufficiently
satisfy that there is an established plan of action in the event that
102
the resident becomes sleep-deprived.
This is met where the
requester demonstrates that the supervising faculty can recognize
signs of fatigue and has a specific plan to counteract any potential
103
negative effects. Finally, any exception to the limit on duty hours
104
must have some nexus to clinical needs. The requester has the
burden of demonstrating that the limit imposed would actually be
105
detrimental to clinical training and education.
Although UMMS’s criteria exception approach is unique, it is
still uncertain whether or not this is an effective method of
106
enforcing maximum standards. For instance, once GMEC grants
such an exception, it is unclear what role GMEC has in ensuring
compliance with the established criteria. From the resident’s
perspective, it is equally uncertain what role he or she has in
requesting an exception or enforcing the maximum-hour
standards. For example, it may be apparent in some circumstances
that a medical resident may be just as qualified to determine
whether or not the granting of an exception is appropriate.

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
102. See GMEC Criteria, supra note 97.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Since the GMEC Criteria were only approved in January 2003, it is still
premature to determine the actual effectiveness of such an approach to enforcing
maximum-hour standards.
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IV. W HISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
A. Legislative Statutes
The failure to impose fines for overtime violation, such as in
New York State, and the lack of effective oversight by the ACGME
have prompted the federal government to assess more innovative
approaches to enforce maximum-hour legislation for medical
107
residents. Central to the question of enforcement is whether or
not whistleblower protections would result in more favorable
108
working conditions for medical residents. This paper posits that
extending whistleblower protection to medical residents gives them
an incentive to disclose working condition violations and
encourages them to assume a regulatory or oversight role.
The use of whistleblower protection as a means to enforce
particular labor statutes, laws, or legislative mandates is not new.
Originating from the act of English bobbies alerting the public and
other law enforcement officials of a commission of a crime by
blowing a whistle, the notion of a whistleblower is consistent with
109
common-law ideals.
Integral to the conceptual framework
embodied in whistleblower protection is the probability that
employers will retaliate against employees in the form of
110
harassment, demotion, or termination. In fact, within the United
States, the relationship between whistleblower protection and
111
retaliatory discharge is well documented.
The application of
whistleblower protection to health professionals is not a new
112
concept either.
107. See generally Joan Corbo, Note, Kraus v. New Rochelle Hosp. Medical Ctr.: Are
Whistleblowers Finally Getting the Protection They Need? 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 141
(1994) (examining state whistleblower statutes and the limited nature of New
York’s whistleblower statute).
108. See generally Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False
Hope for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991) (assessing the extent that
whistleblower protection actually constitutes an assurance of protection and
changes working conditions).
109. Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex.
1990).
110. See Lois A. Lofgren, Comment, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures
and the Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the
Wrongdoing of Employers? 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 316, 317 (1993).
111. See DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE (BNA 1991); Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory
Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277, 280 (1981).
112. See generally Corbo, supra note 107, at 152-53. See also M INN. STAT. §
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The proposed PPSP Act contains a specific section dedicated
113
to providing whistleblower protection.
Section 3(c) of the
proposed act sets forth the following:
(1) IN GENERAL—A hospital . . . shall not penalize,
discriminate, or retaliate in any manner against an
employee with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, who in good
faith . . . individually or in conjunction with another
person or persons—
(A) reports a violation or suspected violation of such
requirements to a public regulatory agency, a private
accreditation body, or management personnel of the
hospital;
(B) initiates, cooperates or otherwise participates in an
investigation or proceeding brought by a regulatory
agency or private accreditation body concerning matters
covered by such requirements;
(C) informs or discusses with other employees, with a
representative of the employees, with patients or patient
representatives, or with the public, violations or suspected
violations of such requirements; or
(D) otherwise avails himself or herself of the rights set
114
forth in such section or this subjection.
The act also formally defines when an employee is deemed to
act in “good faith” if the employee reasonably believes “(A) that the
information reported or disclosed is true; and (B) that a violation
115
has occurred or may occur.”
The insertion of such whistleblower protection is the product
116
of similar legislation, introduced in the same session of Congress.
The intent of the Patient Safety and Health Care Whistleblower
Protection Act of 2001 (hereinafter Whistleblower Protection Act)
is “[t]o prohibit discrimination or retaliation against health care
181.932, subd. 1(d) (2002) (specifically providing whistleblower protection to
health care workers).
113. See Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3236,
107th Cong. § 3(c)(1) (2001). See also Patient and Physician Safety and Protection
Act of 2003, H.R. 1228, 108th Cong. § 3(c)(1) (2003); S. 952, 108th Cong.
§ 3(c)(1) (2003).
114. Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3236, 107th
Cong. § 3(c)(1) (2001).
115. H.R. 3236, § 3(c)(2).
116. Patient Safety and Health Care Whistleblower Protection Act of 2001,
H.R. 2340, 107th Cong. (2001).
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workers who report unsafe conditions and practices which impact
117
on patient care.” In general, section 2(a) of the Act states that:
[n]o person shall retaliate or discriminate in any manner
against any health care worker because the worker (or any
person acting on behalf of the worker) in good faith—
(1) engaged in any disclosure of information relating to
the care, services, or conditions of a health care entity;
(2) advocated on behalf of a patient or patients with
respect to care, services, or conditions or a health care
entity; or
(3) initiated, cooperated, or otherwise participated in any
investigation or proceeding of any governmental entity
relating
to care, services, or conditions of a health care
118
entity.
A significant question is whether a medical resident would also
be afforded whistleblower protection under this Act. In section
6(2), the framers of the legislation specifically define “health care
119
worker” to include a physician, intern, or resident. Thus, the
Whistleblower Protection Act and section 3(c) of the PPSP Act set
forth the basic legislative framework for extending whistleblower
protection to medical residents.
120

B. Incentive-Based Disclosure

The imposition of whistleblower protection is an effective
enforcement mechanism for maximum-hour legislation among
medical residents for a number of reasons. First, medical residents
who complain about excessive hours are clearly at risk for
retaliation. In fact, the fear of retaliation comes from two sources:
program directors and fellow residents who fear that their program

117. H.R. 2340, § 2(a).
118. Id.
119. Id. Compare id. with M INN. STAT. § 181.931, subd. 1 (2002) (defining the
term “employee” as “a person who performs services for hire in Minnesota for an
employer” but making no specific provision for medical residents).
120. The various incentives that are embodied in the language of the PPSP Act
and the Whistleblower Protection Act are what I have dubbed “Incentive-Based
Disclosure.” Essentially, by providing sufficient confidentiality requirements and
the possibility of asserting private causes of action against retaliatory parties, the
proposed legislation attempts to provide sufficient incentives for medical residents
to disclose working violations that will offset any foreseeable costs incurred as a
result of retaliation.
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121

will lose accreditation.
The extension of whistleblower
protection provides some level of counterweight to these possible
122
threats of retaliation.
The whistleblower protection may also act as a sufficient
incentive for overworked medical residents to file complaints. For
instance, under the PPSP Act, “a post graduate trainee or physician
resident may file a complaint with the Secretary of Health and
Human Services concerning a violation of such requirements
123
[where] [s]uch a complaint may be filed anonymously.”
Similarly, under the Whistleblower Protection Act, strict
confidentiality requirements exist. As section 3 of the Act sets
forth, “[t]he identity of a health care worker . . . shall remain
confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person except upon
124
the knowing written consent of the health care worker.”
Additionally, both the PPSA Act and the Whistleblower
Protection Act intentionally define “good faith” disclosures
extremely broadly, giving much deference to both the subjective
judgment and perception of the medical resident. For instance,
the test of “good faith” under the Whistleblower Protection Act is
whether the medical resident,
reasonably believes that—(1) the information is true; and
(2) the information disclosed by the [resident]—(A)
evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or of a
generally recognized professional or clinical standard; or
(B) relates to care, services, or conditions which
potentially 125
endangers one or more patients or workers to
the public.
An additional incentive for medical residents to report
violations is an explicit provision by the Whistleblower Protection
Act, which provides for a private cause of action. Section 4 of the
Act essentially allows any health care worker who believes
retaliation or discrimination occurred as a result of disclosure “may
file a civil action in any Federal or State court of competent

121. Lurie & Wolfe, supra note 87.
122. For discussions of various types of whistleblower protection, see Malin,
supra note 111, and Lofgren, supra note 110.
123. See Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3236,
107th Cong. § 3(b)(2) (2001).
124. See Patient Safety and Health Care Whistleblower Protection Act of 2001,
H.R. 2340, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001).
125. See H.R. 2340, § 2(e); see also H.R. 3236, § 3(c) (for similar provisions).
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126

jurisdiction.” Under the same Act, civil penalties of up to $10,000
127
may be granted for a finding of each violation.
Thus, the
protection of a medical resident in the form of confidentiality and
private causes of action eliminates the possible costs of retaliation
from disclosure.
C. Grass-roots Oversight
The second way in which whistleblower protection provides
effective enforcement mechanism to maximum-hour legislation is
128
through grass-roots oversight.
If sufficient incentives exist to
protect against the threats of retaliation, medical residents could
adopt a regulatory role in the enforcement of maximum-hour
legislation. In fact, both interns and resident physicians voice the
concern that excessive hours impair their performance, blaming
large-scale failure of the medical community in addressing this
129
issue. As one advocate states:
Ten years ago, the AMA called for voluntary compliance
within the medical community as a means of addressing
the issue of fatigued residents . . . . In the intervening
decade, the only marginal progress has been lax
regulations that are rarely enforced by the medical
community’s own accrediting agency. Where the medical
community has failed, the government
must intercede to
130
protect both patient and physician.
Additionally, a quasi-grass-roots reform movement has formed
131
within organizations such as AMSA, an organization with 30,000
in-training physicians. Medical resident survey data compiled by
the AMSA indicate that 60% of obstetric/gynecologic residents
126. See H.R. 2340, § 4(a)(1).
127. See H.R. 2340, § 4(b).
128. See, e.g., ADVOCACY ACTION COMM., AM. MED . STUDENT ASS’ N, at
http://www.amsa.org/adv/advocacy.cfm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003) (discussing
examples of various grass-roots advocacy issues among medical student
organizations).
129. See Papandria, supra note 86.
130. See Press Release, American Medical Student Ass’n, AMA Response to
Resident Work Hour Problems Inadequate, Says Med Student Organization; Federal
Regulations Needed (June 18, 2001), available at http://www.amsa.org/news/
pr/01/0618.cfm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
131. Id. See also Press Release, American Medical Student Ass’n, Medical
Students Mark Historic Work Hours Reform with Call for Whistleblower Protection, Public
Accountability (June 30, 2003), available at http://www.amsa.org/news/pr/
03.0630.cfm (last visited Aug. 17, 2003).
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cited the hours worked as compromising the quality of care to
patients, 30% to 40% indicated that their time was spent on noneducational activities, 41% attributed their most-serious mistakes
made in the previous year to fatigue, and 45% with less than four
132
hours of sleep per night reported committing medical errors.
The AMSA has an active legislative lobby center located in
Washington, D.C., and regularly publishes the findings of such
medical resident surveys.
Reform movements, such as the one led by AMSA,
demonstrate the magnitude to which medical residents and interns
are willing to take upon themselves a regulatory oversight role.
Such reforms will compensate for the failure of traditional
regulatory institutions such as the ACGME.
Extending whistleblower protection to medical residents also
makes sense because medical residents are situated in the most
133
competent position to determine when such violations occur.
Under the PPSP Act, hospitals would be required to give medical
residents notice of “their rights . . . [under the Act] including
methods to enforce such rights (including so-called whistleblower
protections); and the effects of their acute and chronic sleep
134
deprivation both on themselves and on their patients.” Thus, as
long as medical residents understand their enforcement rights,
there is an inherent constraint on the extent that residency
programs could deviate from maximum-hour legislation.
Additionally, the extension of whistleblower protection would
provide residents the impetus to develop micromanaged oversight
committees and discussion groups to determine program
135
violations. Also, graduating medical students have an interest in
knowing which residency programs are abusive versus those that
136
protect the future residents.

132. See AM. MED . STUDENT ASS’ N, LIMIT ON RESIDENT HOURS: SUPPORT H.R.
3236, available at http://www.amsa.org/hp/rwhfact.cfm (last visited Aug. 17,
2003).
133. See Collier et al., supra note 1 (providing factual accounts of residents
observing and experiencing violations of maximum-hour guidelines).
134. See Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 3236,
107th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2001).
135. See, e.g, AM. MED . STUDENT ASS’ N, ADVOCACY ACTION COMMITTEE—RAISING
THE AWARENESS & BREAKING DOWN B ARRIERS, available at http://www.amsa.org/
adv/advocacy.cfm (last visited July 13, 2003) (illustrating various advocacy and
organized medical student groups).
136. See Lurie & Wolfe, supra note 87.
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D. Institutional Submission
Finally, the extension of whistleblower protection to medical
residents forces resident program administrators into a position
requiring their close attention to resident work hours. For
instance, instead of being subject merely to scheduled inspections,
hospitals will have to determine if conditions within the work
environment will result in disclosure of a violation.
Not
surprisingly, hospitals vehemently oppose extending whistleblower
137
protection to medical residents.
A significant concern among medical practitioners is that by
providing medical residents whistleblower protection and the right
to file suits, a hospital’s ability to effectively deliver health care may
be severely compromised. In particular, there is concern that both
physicians and patients may be deterred from disclosing specific
information in reports, records, and charts in the fear that it may
138
be subpoenaed at a future date.
Another concern with extending whistleblower protection is
the issue of discretion: medical residency programs have
educational requirements that may necessitate time commitments
139
that cannot be met under a maximum-hour regime.
Additionally, organizations such as the AMA view the extension of
whistleblower protection as an impediment to the management
and internal affairs of hospitals. Finally, in an era of rising health
care costs, shrinking funds at teaching facilities and increasing legal
malpractice insurance premiums, critics contend that whistleblower
140
protection would aggravate an ailing health care system.
V. CONCLUSION
With the selection of whistleblowers Coleen Rowley, Sherron
Watkins, and Cynthia Cooper as TIME magazine’s 2002 Persons of
the Year, the role of the whistleblower has become personified to
137. See, e.g., AM. MED . STUDENT ASS’ N, RESIDENT WORK HOUR ISSUE DEBATE
SHEET, available at http://www.amsa.org/hp/resworkdebate.cfm (last visited Aug.
17, 2003) (suggesting that hospitals do not think that the extension of
whistleblower protection will be an adequate incentive for self-reporting among
residents).
138. See Statement for the Record Submitted by the American Academy of
Family Physicians, House Comm., Ways and Means, Subcomm. on Health (Sept.
10, 2002).
139. See Papandria, supra note 86.
140. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/18

22

Wilkey: Federal Whistleblower Protection: A Means to Enforcing Maximum-ho
WILKEY_ FORMATTED_S EPT 5.DOC

2003]

9/15/2003 6:17 PM

PROTECTION FOR MEDICAL RESIDENTS

353

141

unprecedented levels. The disclosures by these whistleblowers
have compelled Congress to respond, leading to enactment of
legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the FBI Reform Act, and
142
the Congressional Whistleblower Act.
The structure of the proposed PPSP Act presents an
interesting question: should the federal government employ the
use of whistleblowers or protection thereof to enforce labor-based
legislation? Medical residents are undeniably experiencing
excessive hours of work, resulting in fatigue and exponentially
increasing the risk of harm to both patients and residents
themselves. Although New York State has provided a template for
reform, it is still highly questionable whether routine inspections
and the imposition of fines have necessarily translated into
concrete change.
Federal agencies such as the AHRQ, the Department of Labor,
and OSHA purport to provide an unlimited set of federal
enforcement resources. Unfortunately, as this paper sets forth, the
government has historically deferred to private quasi-regulatory
agencies, such as the ACGME, to enforce such labor standards. But
the ACGME lacks resources, oversight authority, and any formal
mechanism to effectively enforce maximum-hour standards for
medical residents. Furthermore, the ACGME’s requirement that
residency programs implement independent guidelines and
standards has been thwarted by discretionary institutional
deviations. The University of Minnesota Medical School’s criterionbased exception approach appears to be a unique method of
enforcing the ACGME maximum-hour standards and may serve as
a template for other states to follow, but this is still highly uncertain
given the infancy of such an approach.
Whistleblower protection in section 3 of the PPSP Act is an
innovative tool to ensure enforcement of maximum-hour
legislation. The very nature of extending whistleblower protection
to medical residents creates a form of incentive-based disclosure.
Efforts by organizations, such as AMSA, explicitly demonstrate that
residents are willing to take upon themselves such regulatory roles.
The extension of whistleblower protection ensures that medical
residents are collectively able to compensate for the failure of
141. Reaction of Sen. Patrick Leahy to TIME Magazine’s Selection of 3
Whistleblowers as Persons of the Year, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 22, 2002, available at
2002 WL 101759570.
142. Id.
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traditional methods of enforcement. Such protection will translate
into institutional submissiveness where residency program
administrators will inherently be more apt to adhere to maximumhour restrictions because violations would likely be disclosed.
The extension of whistleblower protection to medical residents
is by no means a panacea to current abusive working conditions.
Roles exist for the federal government, the states, and institutional
organizations such as the ACGME. Whistleblower protection
provides one subtle yet effective regulatory tool that could
undoubtedly result in enforcement of labor standards and
ultimately better working conditions for medical residents.
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